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1. Introduction 
In two fields of economics there has been some literature on the “common pool” 
problem, where there are multilateral incentives to defect from cooperative strategies. 
One of these fields relates to groups drawing upon the common pool of public budgetary 
resources discussed in the context of fiscal stabilization primarily in Latin America (see, 
for example, Velasco (1998); the other relates to the collective action problem in 
management of local environmental resources (see, for example, Baland and Platteau 
(2003). In the former, primarily macro literature, the typical models assume symmetry 
among the players, so that the incentives are also symmetric. However, if players differ 
systematically in some initial conditions (for example, in their initial wealth), their 
incentives to defect may also differ systematically. This has implications for the size and 
composition of groups that are able to sustain cooperation, and this is the issue that we 
explore in this paper. 
In the second, more micro, literature initial wealth inequality has been considered, but 
mostly in the context of static two-player games. In this paper we construct a repeated-
game, multi-player model  (allowing for coalition formation), focusing on the effects of 
wealth inequality in the matter of collective action in management of local environmental 
resources or in firms or localities benefiting from a common provision of infrastructural 
services. 
In a one-shot ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ type situation, defection is always a dominant 
strategy. Hence, cooperation in equilibrium requires some additional device. Here we use 
the standard assumption of repeated interaction, with trigger strategies that support 
cooperation as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). 
Our model considers distributional inequality with respect to a nontransferable resource, 
which we simply call private capital. The non-transferability assumption is only an 
extreme form of capital market imperfection that in a milder form is not unrealistic in 
most situations. Furthermore, it considers a setting in which cooperation promises to 
yield efficiency gains relative to the status quo not by promoting efficiency-enhancing 
redistributions of capital (i.e., from where its marginal return is already low to where it is 
still high), but instead, by promoting the adoption of efficient technologies for producing Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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capital-complementing inputs. Examples of such inputs could be R&D, irrigation, 
infrastructural services, etc.  
In our model, incentives for cooperation tend to be stronger for wealthier agents (all else 
equal) and there can be a threshold level of distributional inequality beyond which 
cooperation is enforceable for the richly endowed and unenforceable for the poorly 
endowed.  This result is somewhat similar to that of common pool models in which 
cooperation is more easily sustained in times of plenty, due to the fact that wealth 
accumulation and incentives for maintaining cooperation are mutually reinforcing 
(Aizenman, 1998; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996), although the logic of our model is 
quite different.   
Our paper examines when different kinds of coalition structures can emerge, and what the 
impacts of redistribution may be in such settings. A key idea that we explore is that too 
much inequality destabilizes cooperation by making it impossible to satisfy some 
incentive compatibility constraints, particularly those of the poor. In some cases, 
redistribution that increases inequality may actually hurt people who directly gain from 
the redistribution, through this process of destabilizing cooperation. Conversely, 
redistribution that reduces inequality may help those who give up some wealth, by 
increasing the scope of cooperation. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
presents basic results for the case where the fruits of cooperation do not depend on the 
size or composition of the coalition. This section also considers the effects of ex post side 
payments. Section 4 allows for size and composition effects, and considers the welfare 
impacts of redistribution in more detail. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model 
Consider the following infinitely repeated game among n agents, indexed by i, from 
poorest to richest, in terms of their private capital, Ki. Hence, Ki  ≤ Ki+1. Time proceeds in 
discrete periods, and the agents have a common discount factor, β. 
 Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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Stage Game 
The economy enters each new period with a total private capital endowment of K, of 
which each agent controls share si. Hence, Ki  ≡ siK .  Each agent's utility is assumed to be 
increasing in his consumption of own-produced output, Yi, and decreasing in his effort 
level, ei with the linear from given by:   
Ui   =   Yi  –  cei.  (1)
While comparative statics with respect to c can be carried out, they are relatively 
straightforward, and it simplifies notation to assume that c = 1, which we impose in the 
rest of the paper. 
Production of output Yi is assumed to be described by a Cobb-Douglas technology, with 
constant returns to scale with respect to private capital Ki, and a complementary input, 
labeled Ai, which may represent infrastructure or something similar: 
Yi   =   Ai
α Ki
(1 - α).  (2)
Property rights with respect to private capital are assumed to be fully secure.  The 
complementary input Ai is produced by agent effort via one of two possible technologies, 
and can be either private or public (in the non-excludable sense) depending on the 
technology selected.  Each agent has access to a unique ‘status quo’ technology, defined 
by the equation: 
Ai   =   RLiei                         (3)
 In most of the paper, we shall assume that RLi is the same for all individuals. However, 
we will also briefly analyze the case where  RLi ≤ RLi+1, so that a richer agent’s status quo 
production technology may be superior to that of a poorer player. Instead of the 
individual status quo technology, the agents may also choose to employ a ‘cooperative’ 
technology that is defined by the equation 
ΣAi      =   RH Σ ei    (4)
where RH > RLi for all i.  While the cooperative technology is the most efficient option, 
we assume that its output (measured in units of the complementary input A) is subject to a 
pure common pool problem – namely, each agent has the ability to grab all the fruits of Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
  5
cooperation, RHΣ ei , for himself.  Again, later in the paper, we analyze what happens 
when this extreme assumption is relaxed. 
In contrast, each agent is assured of securing the fruits of his own labor when using his 
status quo technology.  As a result, use of the cooperative technology for production of 
the complementary input A cannot be sustained in the absence of the appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms.  Formally, we can represent the stage game as a prisoners’ 
dilemma in which the only Nash Equilibrium involves mutual defection. The game is 
illustrated for the two-person case in Table 1, where the agents are labeled R and P for 
rich and poor. Note that in the general, n-person case, there will always be an incentive 
for any individual to deviate, for any subset of cooperating individuals. Hence, the 
uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium applies in general. 
Table 1 
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As is evident from Table 1, we are making two simplifying assumptions: the first is that 
mutual defection yields payoffs equivalent to those obtained when each player simply 
chooses his status quo technology (although all that matters is that mutual defection 
generates individual payoffs strictly greater than zero, and strictly less than those from 
mutual cooperation); the second is that, in the fully cooperative outcome, the ratio of the 
players’ payoffs is equal to the ratio of their contributions to the cooperative effort – Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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namely, when both players cooperate, each player receives an amount of capital-
complementing input equal to 
Ai   =   RHei. (5)
This assumption allows us to keep the algebra simple (in particular by allowing us to 
restrict the issue of free-riding to instances where an agent chooses to defect from the 
cooperative norm), but also has two important implications.  First, as we can soon verify 
by checking equation (8), it yields the social surplus-maximizing distribution of the 
complementary input A, as the ratio Ai/Aj is equal to Ki/Kj in equilibrium
1. Second, it 
implies that social welfare is independent of distributional inequality, and depends only 
on whether or not cooperation takes place (i.e., social welfare can take on only one of two 
possible values, one corresponding to the status quo outcome and one corresponding to 
the cooperative outcome). 
 
Stage game and lifetime payoffs 
In the decentralized equilibrium, each agent chooses ei to maximize equation (1), given 
equation (3).  The solution to this optimization problem is 




Li i statusquo i R K e   (6)
As is expected, each agent's optimal choice of effort is increasing in his holdings of 
private capital.
2  Substituting equation (6) into equation (1), and recalling that each agent 
has a discount factor of β, we can write the lifetime utility of each agent under the status 
quo as  
                                                 




1-α, where the Ai's and Ki's must 
each sum to fixed quantities, is maximized when A1/A2  = K1/K2. 
2 If we retain the cost of effort parameter, c, from equation (1), this would enter the denominator of the 
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Li i i R K Q   (7)
 We now turn to the stage game payoffs under full cooperation.  Since we have assumed 
that cooperation simply allows each agent to secure a return to effort equal to RH instead 
of RLi (equation (5) vs. equation (3)), each agent’s effort choice under full cooperation is 
equal to: 




H i cooperate i R K e   (8)











) 1 ( ) (
1
1 1
H i i R K C   (9)
From equations (7) and (9), it is clear that the rich agent does better than the poor agent in 
both the status quo and cooperative outcomes, and in addition, that the incremental 
payoff to cooperation relative to the status quo is higher for the rich agent than for the 
poor agent.  Finally, let us calculate the stage game payoff from defecting when the other 
agent cooperates.  Since a defecting agent i appropriates the fruits of the effort of all other 
agents, j, the latter sum of efforts factors into his own effort choice.  Given that all other 
agents j cooperate, agent i’s optimal choice of effort is equal to  
∑
≠




H i defect i e R K e ,
1
1
, ) (  (10)
provided that this expression is nonnegative, revealing a free rider effect for the defecting 
player i.  Thus, there is a double benefit from defection in this model: there is free riding 
in effort as well as all the fruits from cooperation being captured. Substituting equation 







− α = ∑
≠




j i H defect i K K R Max e   (11)
We see from equation (11) that, when defecting, an agent whose share of total private 
capital is no more than 0.5 chooses an effort level of zero, while an agent whose share of Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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total private capital is greater than 0.5 – if such an agent exists – chooses a strictly 
positive effort level (equal to his cooperative effort level minus the cooperative effort 
level of all the other agents).  Substituting equation (11) into equation (1), we can 
calculate the stage game payoffs from defection for these two types of agents, 
respectively, as 
α − α α −
α
− α =
1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( i i H i s s R K D   (12)
and 
)] 1 2 ( [ ) ( 1 − α − α = α −
α
i i H i s s R K D   (13)
An examination of equations (12) and (13) reveals that each type of player’s static payoff 
from defection is a function of his share, si, of the total private capital.  Consider equation 
(13) first, where si  > 0.5.  Depending on the parameter α, Di is monotonically increasing 
in the share si if and only if α < 0.5. In other words, increasing the share of a dominant 
rich agent increases (decreases) static payoffs from defection when production relies 
more (less) heavily on private capital.  Now consider equation (12).  A simple calculation 
shows that Di is monotonically increasing in the share if and only if α < 1 – si, where the 
quantity (1 – si) is greater than 0.5, by assumption. 
Therefore, whenever α  < 0.5 (so that production is more private capital intensive), an 
increase in the share of private capital increases the defection payoffs of a dominant rich 
agent (if he exists) and decreases the defection payoffs of all other types of agents.  On 
the other hand, whenever α  > 0.5, the rich agent's defection payoffs are decreasing in his 
share, while the relationship between other agents’ defection payoffs and their share is 
inverse U-shaped. 
   
Sustaining Cooperation 
We now identify the conditions under which trigger strategies can sustain cooperation in 
the infinitely repeated version of the stage game.  Cooperation will be sustainable via 
trigger strategies if both players choose to cooperate with the understanding that Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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defection at any time t will trigger a permanent reversion to the Nash equilibrium of the 
stage game.  That is, cooperation is sustainable so long as no agent at any time t is willing 
to forsake the incremental returns to cooperation (relative to the status quo) from time t + 
1 onwards in exchange for the one-time payoff from defection at time t.  Formally, 
cooperation is sustainable if and only if the condition labeled ICi holds: 
ICi:     Ci    ≥    Di   +   βQi      (14)
for each agent i.   
The incentive compatibility constraint particular to this model is as follows for an agent 


























































































In either case, the left hand side of the condition is greater than 1, since RH is greater than 
RLi. As expected, either form of incentive compatibility constraint is more likely to hold 
when agents are more forward-looking (β is larger), and when the incremental return to 
cooperation relative to the status quo is larger (RH is larger relative to the RLi). We are 
particularly interested in the impact of changes in the shares, si, on the incentive 
compatibility condition. In order to investigate this, it is useful to combine (15) and (16) 
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The following Lemma will be very useful in our subsequent analysis. Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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Lemma 1  
) , ( α φ s is continuous and differentiable in s at s = 0.5. Furthermore, it is strictly 
decreasing for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. 
Proof 
When s = 0.5,  ) , ( α φ s = 1/(1-α). The function is clearly continuous from the left. Taking 
the limit as s approaches 0.5 from the right, we get α/(1-α) + 1, which equals 1/(1-α). 
This proves continuity. 
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It is easy to check that the derivative function is continuous at s = 0.5 (the left and right 
derivatives are equal). Hence  ) , ( α φ s is differentiable in s at s = 0.5. Finally, we see that 
the derivative is always negative for the specified domain of s, establishing that  ) , ( α φ s is 
strictly decreasing.      
We are now ready to analyze the model and derive our results. 
 
3. Basic Results 
In this section, we maintain all the assumptions imposed so far, and add the assumption 
that RLi is independent of i. Looking at the incentive compatibility constraint, we see that 
this implies that the left hand side of that constraint is identical for all agents. The right 
hand side varies only as a result of varying shares of private capital. Hence, we will be 
able to derive some results that relate the formation of coalitions (cooperating with 
respect to producing the input A) to the distribution of private capital.  Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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Before proceeding, we rewrite the combined incentive compatibility constraint as 
follows: 






























It will also be useful to have a symbol for the left hand side of (18), and we shall denote 
this by Λ, where the dependence on the various parameters is suppressed for brevity. 
Note that our simplification implies that Λ is the same for all agents. 
We must note the following complication in looking at coalitions. Suppose that we 
consider any proper subset of the n agents as a possible coalition. Then the total private 
capital of this subset will be lower than K, and the shares of the agents in the potential 
coalition will be appropriately redefined. However, condition (18) still describes the 
incentive compatibility constraint faced by each member of the potential coalition, with 
the shares recalculated. For example, suppose that there are four individuals with shares 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4. If the two poorest agents form a coalition, their shares in this group 
are now ⅓ and ⅔. 
We begin by examining possible two person coalitions, where a coalition is our term for a 
group that cooperates in the production of infrastructure, as described earlier. First, we 
introduce the following definition. 
 
Definition 1 
A coalition is potentially stable if the incentive compatibility constraint (18) holds for 
each member of the coalition. 
The reason we use the qualifier potentially is that satisfaction of (18) is necessary for a 
coalition to work, but it may not be sufficient to maintain the coalition, since there could 
be other, more attractive opportunities for combining with others. We discuss this issue 
after Proposition 4. 




Assume that  1 ) 1 ( > α − Λ . Consider the coalition of agents i and j, with initial shares si 
and sj of total private capital K, and assume, without loss of generality, that si < sj. This 
coalition is potentially stable if and only if  i j s s α α − Λ ≤
1
)) 1 ( (   
Proof 
From Lemma 1, we know that if (18) holds for i, it also holds for j.  Hence, we need only 
check (18) for agent i, who must have a share less than 0.5. Therefore, using (17) and 
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In doing so, we have calculated the coalition shares as discussed earlier in this section. 













) 1 ( 
This can finally be rearranged as 
i j s s α α − Λ ≤
1
)) 1 ( ( , 
which is the required condition.              
 
Remarks 
By assumption, the factor multiplying si on the right hand side of the inequality condition 
in Proposition 1 is greater than 1, so that the inequality can potentially hold. The 
condition in Proposition 1 is clearly a combined assumption about the magnitudes of the 
discount factor, the relative gains from cooperation, and the importance of private capital 
in production. If it is violated, the two-person coalition can never be potentially stable. Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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Even if it holds, the condition for potential stability requires that the inequality between 
the two partners be limited, as captured in the condition of Proposition 1. We can also 
note that, for any agent i, the case of minimal inequality for two-person coalitions 
involving this agent will be in partnership with either neighbor in the private capital 
distribution. 




 If a two-person coalition involving agents i and j is not potentially stable, then adding 
other agents cannot make the resulting coalition potentially stable. 
Proof 
Adding other agents must reduce the shares of the agents in the new coalition versus the 
old. By Lemma 1, this can only increase the right hand side of (18). Hence, if (18) was 
violated for one of the agents in the two-person coalition, it must still be violated in the 
larger  coalition.            
Propositions 1 and 2 can be combined in the following result, which identifies when an 
individual cannot be part of any potentially stable coalition. 
 
Proposition 3 
 If, for individual i, it is true that  i i s s α
+ α − Λ >
1
1 )) 1 ( ( and that  1
1
)) 1 ( ( −
α α − Λ > i i s s , then 
this individual cannot be part of any potentially stable coalition. 
Proof 
By Proposition 1, we know that i cannot be in a potentially stable two-person coalition 
with either of his neighbors in the distribution of private capital. Furthermore, he cannot 
be in a potentially stable two-person coalition with anyone else, since the inequality will Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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only be greater. By Proposition 2, adding other agents to any two-person coalition 
containing i will still leave at least one incentive compatibility condition unsatisfied.   
 
Remarks 
Proposition 3 tells us that inequality that is excessive anywhere in the distribution can 
isolate individuals, by making it impossible for them to engage in cooperative groups or 
coalitions. 
Conversely, ruling out such cases allows one to characterize the potential for cooperation 
more sharply. We first define a coalition structure. 
 
Definition 2 
A coalition structure is a partition of the set N = {1, 2, 3, …, n}, such that all the agents 
in any element of the partition cooperate with each other in production of the 
infrastructure good, and not with agents in any other element of the partition. 
 
We have the following result on when ICi (condition (18)) is satisfied for all agents 
except possibly the poorest, so that all coalitions in the structure are potentially stable.  
 
Proposition 4 
If  i i s s α
+ α − Λ ≤
1
1 )) 1 ( ( for all i = 1, …n-1, then there exists a coalition structure such that 
ICi is satisfied at least for all i > 1. 
Proof 
From condition (18), since the right hand side is strictly decreasing in si, if (18) holds for 
agent i, it must hold for all agents with index greater than i, by Lemma 1. Suppose that 
(18) holds for agent 1. Then we are done, since (18) then holds for all agents. If not, then 
eliminate agent 1, and recalculate the shares for everyone else as sj′ = sj/(1-s1). If s2′ is Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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such that (18) holds, then again, by Lemma 1, it holds for all agents with index greater 
than 2. If not, then we eliminate agent 2 and recalculate the shares. 
Once we have reached the end of this iterative procedure, we have found an integer m′ 
such that (18) holds for i ≥ m′. By Proposition 1, we know that m′< n, since the coalition 
of the wealthiest two agents is potentially stable, by Proposition 1. Now consider the 
remaining agents, with i < m′. Recalculate the shares for this subset of agents. Once 
again, if (18) holds for agent 1, then it holds for all agents in this subset. If not, eliminate 
agent 1, recalculate the shares, and proceed as before. In each case, we must reduce m′ by 
at least two at each stage. If at any stage, only agents 1 and 2 are left, then again, by 
Proposition 1, we know that they can form a potentially stable partnership. If only agent 1 
is left, he may not be part of any potentially stable coalition, since, by construction, he 
cannot join any coalition formed at an earlier iteration.          
 
Since satisfaction of the incentive compatibility condition (18) is the key necessary 
condition for a coalition of agents to engage in cooperation, Proposition 4 is the basis for 
characterizing one possible form of the equilibrium coalition structure. We need to make 
some observations and provide a definition before we proceed with this characterization. 
First, observe that an agent’s utility from cooperation in the basic model is independent 
of the size and composition of the coalition to which he belongs: this is evident from 
equation (9). It follows that if an agent is part of any coalition, he has no incentive to 
deviate, either individually, or as part of a subgroup, as long as no ex post side payments 
are allowed. Furthermore, it follows that, in the absence of such side payments, an agent 
who is not part of any coalition cannot bribe an agent in a coalition to defect.  With these 
points in mind, we provide the following definition. 
 
Definition 3 
A coalition structure is stable in the absence of side payments if no member of any 
coalition can gain by defecting in any of the following ways, where ex post side payments 
are not allowed: Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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(i)  unilaterally leaving one coalition to join another, 
(ii)  leaving the initial coalition together with others from the same coalition, to 
create a new coalition in which no one is worse off than before, 
(iii)  leaving the initial coalition together with others from different coalitions, to 
create a new coalition in which no one is worse off than before, 
(iv)  leaving the initial coalition together with others from the same coalition, to 
join an existing coalition in which no one in the enlarged coalition is worse off 
than before, 
(v)  leaving the initial coalition together with others from different coalitions, to 
join an existing coalition in which no one in the enlarged coalition is worse off 
than before. 
 
We have offered an exhaustive list of possible deviations in our definition, on the basis of 
what seems reasonable. Note that deviations do not have to result in stable coalition 
structures, nor even be self-enforcing. Thus, we do not consider second order deviations, 
where, for example, some subset of those deviating will further deviate. Comparing this 
approach with that of the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) of Bernheim, Peleg 
and Whinston (1987), we are restricting the equilibrium more, by allowing more general 
deviations. The reason we are able to take this approach is the special structure of our 
model. Note that CPNE has been criticized by Xue (2000) on the basis of the nestedness 
and myopia assumptions that it incorporates. By relaxing both these, Xue offers an 
alternative equilibrium concept, that of Negotiation Proof Nash Equilibrium (NPNE). We 
relax the nestedness, but not the myopia assumption. Ray and Vohra (1997) offer an 
approach that is similar to CPNE, but allows for binding agreements. The difference that 
this makes to the analysis, as well as a clear and comprehensive discussion of the 
literature, can also be found in that paper.
3  
                                                 
3 It will be noticed that we also avoid any formal specification of bargaining procedures. A detailed analysis 
of bargaining protocols and coalition formation, and additional literature references, are both provided by Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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With Definition 3, we can state our next result. 
 
Proposition 5 
If  i i s s α
+ α − Λ ≤
1
1 )) 1 ( ( for all i = 1, …n-1, then there always exists a coalition structure 
that is stable in the absence of side payments that has the following properties: 
(i)  Suppose that the elements of the partition, Pu, are ranked by the private capital 
of the richest agent in each element, so that if u′ < u″, then the richest agent in 
Pu″ is at least as rich as the richest agent in Pu′. Then it is the case that the 
poorest agent in Pu″ is also at least as rich as the richest agent in Pu′. 
(ii)  Each agent belongs to a cooperative group, except possibly the single poorest 
agent. 
Proof 
By Proposition 4, we can find a partition such as that described in the statement of 
Proposition 5, where each agent is part of a cooperative group, except possibly the 
poorest agent, and where ICi is satisfied for each agent given the coalition structure. 
Since no single agent or group of agents can gain by defecting in any of the ways 
described in Definition 3, the result holds.            
 
Remarks 
The interest of Proposition 5 is that it describes a stable coalition structure that has the 
features of assortative matching equilibria (Becker 1973; Durlauf and Seshadri, 2003; the 
latter paper has additional references to this literature), but under very different 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ray and Vohra (1999). The special structure of our model includes the income distribution and production 
technology assumptions, as well as those with respect to moral hazard. Genicot and Ray (2003) analyze a 
model in which incentive constraints matter. In this paper, as well as in special cases considered in Ray and 
Vohra (1999), symmetry is used to sharpen the analysis. In contrast, asymmetry in the form of a wealth 
distribution is central to our analysis. Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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conditions. In the basic model, there is no productivity gain to aligning with those who 
have similar wealth endowments. Instead, the logic of combining with those who are 
close in the wealth distribution is that it reduces inequality within the coalition, making it 
easier to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. This feature is not present at all in 
the usual assortative matching models. 
Note also that the coalition structure in Proposition 5 need not be a unique equilibrium. 
This will be seen explicitly in Proposition 7, below. 
The next result describes the impact of a particular kind of increase in inequality on the 
equilibrium described in Proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 6 
Given a stable coalition structure of the form described in Proposition 5, a redistribution 
of private capital that leads to a Lorenz-dominating increase in inequality within a group 
cannot increase the size of that group, and may reduce it, assuming that the form of the 
coalition structure does not change. 
Proof 
By Lemma 1, the poorest person in the group has the tightest incentive compatibility 
constraint. A Lorenz-dominating increase in inequality either reduces the poorest 
person’s share, or leaves it unchanged. In the former case, if the share is reduced enough, 
the incentive compatibility condition is violated, and the poorest person may have to drop 
out  of  the  coalition.             
 
The condition used in Propositions 4 and 5, by ruling out the case analyzed in Proposition 
3, ensures that one does not have to have isolated individuals (i.e., those who are not part 
of any cooperative group in a stable coalition structure) in the middle of the wealth 
distribution. The equilibrium coalition structure described in Proposition 5 involves 
sorting by wealth levels. The next result shows that even if  i i s s α
+ α − Λ ≤
1
1 )) 1 ( ( for all i = Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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1, …n-1, we may have non-assortative coalition structures that are stable. Note that the 
assortative structure must also be a possible equilibrium in such cases.  
 
Proposition 7 
Even if  i i s s α
+ α − Λ ≤
1
1 )) 1 ( ( for all i = 1, …n-1, there may exist a coalition structure that 
is stable in the absence of side payments in which individuals who are not adjacent in the 
wealth distribution cooperate, excluding those in between. 
Proof 
The proof is by construction. 
Let n = 3, and let  2 )) 1 ( (
1
= α − Λ α . 
Let the shares be 0.25, 0.3 and 0.45. We see that the condition of the proposition, 
i i s s α
+ α − Λ ≤
1
1 )) 1 ( ( , is easily satisfied. Furthermore, (18) is violated for agents 1 and 2, 
so the grand coalition of all three agents is not potentially stable. 
Now consider the coalition {1, 3}. It is easy to check that  ′ α − Λ ≤ ′ α
1
1
3 )) 1 ( ( s s , where 
these are the shares recalculated for the two-person coalition, and this is the IC condition 
for agent 1 (the IC condition for 3 is then satisfied, by Lemma 1). Hence the coalition is 
potentially stable. Hence the coalition structure [{1, 3}, {2}] is stable.       
 
Remarks 
In the example, it is also the case, as was discussed above, that the coalition structure 
which has the form described in Proposition 5, i.e., [{1}, {2, 3}], is stable. In fact, the 
structure [{1, 2}, {3}] is also stable in this case. Also, note that in the example, 
1 3 1 3
1
2 2 / / ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( s s s s s s = ′ ′ ≥ α − Λ > − α . Taking the inequality between the two 
extreme expressions and simplifying, we get the necessary condition that  1 2 2) 1 ( s s s < −  Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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for the coalition {1, 3} to be potentially stable. The interest of this condition is that it puts 
a bound on local wealth inequality that is independent of the other parameters, unlike the 
condition used in Proposition 1.  
The last inequality condition is specific to the three-person example. We can generalize it 





j T s S . For simplicity, assume that the share of agent k+1 does not exceed 0.5. If the 
IC condition is violated for agents k, k+1 in the coalition T ∪{k, k+1}, but satisfied for 
agent k in the coalition T ∪{k}, then the following two inequalities must hold 
simultaneously: 
α
+ + + ∪ α − Λ > −
1
1 1 } 1 , { )) 1 ( ( / ) ( k k k k T s s S , and 
α
∪ α − Λ ≤ −
1
} { )) 1 ( ( / ) ( k k k T s s S . 
Combining the inequalities and simplifying, we obtain the general necessary condition 
that  ) / 1 ( } 1 , { 1 1 + ∪ + + − > k k T k k k S s s s . Again, this gives an upper bound on local inequality that 
is independent of the other parameters. If it is violated, we have the following negative 
result, which rules out coalitions in which a poorer person in the wealth distribution is 
included, but his richer distributional neighbor is not. 
 
Proposition 8 
Suppose T is any proper subset of N, and suppose agents k, k+1 are not in T. If, in the 
coalition T ∪{k, k+1}, the share of k+1 does not exceed 0.5, k+1 violates (18) for this 
coalition, and  ) / 1 ( } 1 , { 1 1 + ∪ + + − ≤ k k T k k k S s s s , then T∪{k} cannot be a potentially stable 
coalition. 
Proof 
The proof follows immediately from the calculations preceding the proposition.    Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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The analysis to this point is greatly simplified by the fact that the size and composition of 
a cooperative group do not affect its productivity. In this case, as long as an agent is part 
of a coalition, the structure of the coalition does not matter. Given a stable coalition 
structure, the only agents who can benefit from a change in the structure are those who 
are isolated, and not part of any cooperative group. Since they benefit, they can 
potentially bribe someone to defect from their initial group and partner with them, but we 
have ruled out such ex post side payments up to this point. We first analyze the 
implications of relaxing this assumption in the basic model.  
The possibility of side payments introduces a major complication if they are fully 
anticipated. Recall that an agent’s effort choice under cooperation was assumed to be 
determined based on a particular split of the jointly produced input, as given in equation 
(5). This split was used in deriving the equilibrium cooperative effort level, given in (8). 
If an agent anticipates that some of the gains from cooperation are going to have to be 
paid ex post in order to ensure cooperation, this can affect his effort decision. We shall 
finesse this problem by assuming that this link does not exist in the agent’s calculations, 
because he treats ex post side payments as lump sum transfers. 
 Consider now the circumstances under which side payments may change the equilibrium 
coalition structure. Clearly, this can happen only if there is an individual who is not part 
of any coalition in an initial candidate for the equilibrium. Such an individual, say j, gets 
Qj instead of Cj (equations (7) and (9)) and can gain up to Cj - Qj by gaining a partner. 
Thus, up to this amount can be used as a side payment to gain a partner, say agent k. Note 
that we are measuring side payments as a present discounted value: this can be converted 
to a constant per period payment in practice. 
A constraint on the possibility of using a side payment is that the partnership must be 
potentially stable. Hence, the conditions such as those in Proposition 1 must hold for the 
pair, j and k. A complication is that the side payment can itself modify the incentive 
compatibility conditions and we will return to a fuller analysis of this point, after several 
other issues have been noted. 
Note that switching to this coalition by other agents only makes satisfaction of the 
incentive compatibility constraints more difficult, since the shares of coalition members Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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fall when new members are added. Furthermore, there is no gain in utility from a larger 
coalition. All these factors imply that we need only consider deviations of the first type, 
of those listed in Definition 3. There is one other possibility, however. If j and k were 
both isolated in the initial candidate equilibrium, they could not have formed a potentially 
stable coalition in the first place, and they can do so now only if the transfer payments 
change the incentive compatibility conditions.  
We first assume that k is part of another coalition in the initial situation. Now there are 
two possibilities to consider. Either k is initially part of a pair, or part of a larger group. In 
the latter case, switching by k does not cost the initial coalition anything. Therefore, they 
will not pay anything to retain k in their coalition. Thus, any side payment ε > 0 will be 
sufficient to get k to switch into a partnership with j. The only role the side payment will 
play is in achieving incentive compatibility. On the other hand, if k is initially part of a 
pair, then j has to be able to outbid k’s initial partner, say l. The condition for this would 
be Cj - Qj  > Cl - Ql. From equations (7) and (9), we see that this is equivalent to Kj > Kl. 
At this stage, we have to consider the impact of side payments on the incentive 
compatibility constraints.  Let Ti be the transfer payment (in present value terms) 
received by agent i, where Ti may be negative as well as positive. Assuming that the 
payment is timed in a way that it is not received if defection occurs, then the incentive 
compatibility constraint is now 
ICi(T):     Ci  +  Ti ≥    Di   +   βQi      (19)
Substituting and rearranging, we get the following. The incentive compatibility constraint 
is as follows for an agent whose share is no more than 0.5: 
















































It is as follows for an agent whose share exceeds 0.5: Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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In each case, we see that a positive transfer payment relaxes the incentive compatibility 
constraint, while a negative one tightens it. Thus, since the right hand side is decreasing 
in si in the absence of side payments, the only case in which a side payment can achieve 
incentive compatibility in a two-person coalition (where it would not hold otherwise) is 
through a transfer from the richer partner to the poorer one.  
Also, note that if the transfer payment is negative, then the right hand side is still 
decreasing in si. However, if the transfer payment is positive, the last term is increasing in 
si, so this property no longer necessarily holds. Note that, as usual, if these constraints are 
applied to a proper subset of N, the shares and total private capital are interpreted as those 
for the subset. This introduces a further complication, in that the last term introduces a 
dependence of the side payment on the total private capital of the coalition. 
Now consider again the problem of whether agent j will switch from partnering l to 
partnering j. We have assumed that the partnership {k, l} does not require side payments 
for incentive compatibility. If Kk >Kj > Kl, then j and k are closer in the wealth 
distribution than k and l, and therefore the incentive compatibility constraints must hold 
for the partnership {j, k} without side payments. In this case, the amount that j has to pay 
to get k to switch is enough so that (i) j’s incentive compatibility constraint is still 
satisfied, (ii) l’s incentive compatibility constraint is not satisfied, and (iii) j’s individual 
rationality constraint is still satisfied. The latter inequality is simply Cj - Qj + Tj ≥ 0. 
However, since Dj > (1-β)Qj, it follows that if the incentive compatibility constraint (19) 
holds, then so does individual rationality, so (iii) is redundant. In fact, since agent l’s 
incentive compatibility constraint is tighter than agent j’s in a partnership with k, the side 
payment has to be just enough so that if l tries to match it, he will violate his incentive 
compatibility condition. 
We illustrate the above discussion with the three-person special case that was used to 
prove Proposition 7, which we now label Example 1. 
 Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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Example 1 
In this case, n = 3, and  2 )) 1 ( (
1
= α − Λ α , while the shares are 0.25, 0.3 and 0.45. The 
grand coalition of all three agents is not potentially stable, but any two-person coalition is 
potentially stable. Thus, in the absence of side payments, we have three possible stable 
coalition structures. Now consider the structure [{1, 3}, {2}]. Agent 2 can make a side 
payment to agent 3, in order to create the alternative structure, [{1}, {2, 3}]. The transfer 
payment required to achieve this must satisfy the condition that if agent 1 were to make 
the same side payment, his incentive compatibility constraint in a partnership with 3 
would be violated. This requires 


















< Λ α −
α
α




Here s1′ = 5/14. If we assume that α = 0.5, then Λ = 2√2. Substituting in these values, we 
get 
2√2 < 2√1.8 – 56TK′ /(5RH), or 
– T  > 5RH (√2 – √1.8)/28 K′. 
In this case, K′ is the private capital of the coalition {1, 3}. 
There remains one other issue to be discussed, which we shall do in the context of this 
example. We have argued that the coalition {2, 3} will form over {1, 3}, because 2 can 
make a side payment to 3 that cannot be matched by 1, because it would lead to 1’s 
incentive compatibility constraint being violated. While we assumed that {1, 3} was the 
initial coalition, the same argument would apply if {2, 3} were the starting point. A third 
possibility is that {1, 2} is the initial coalition. In this case, 3 could make a side payment 
to 1 or to 2. Since a side payment to a poorer partner will relax the recipient’s incentive 
compatibility constraint, the only issue is the satisfaction of 3’s own incentive 
compatibility constraint in the partnership. Thus, from 3’s perspective, 1 and 2 are 
equally good partners. In either case, an arbitrarily small side payment will ensure that 
agent 3 gets a partner. Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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The conclusion of our discussion, in the context of the example, is therefore that, of the 
three coalition structures that are stable in the absence of side payments, only the 
coalition structure [{1}, {2, 3}] is stable in the presence of side payments. Note that the 
grand coalition is still not stable, because agent 1 cannot credibly make side payments to 
the others, since his incentive compatibility constraint will not hold in that case. In the 
stable coalition structure, 2 can be replaced cheaply, whereas 2 has to outbid 1 to partner 
with 3. However, it seems the side payment that 2 must make to 3 will depend on the 
sequence of proposals.
4  




Assume  i i s s α
+ α − Λ ≤
1
1 )) 1 ( ( for all i = 1, …n-1. In the presence of ex post lump sum 
side payments, no stable coalition structure can leave agent i isolated, where i > 1. 
Proof 
The proof proceeds along the lines of the discussion preceding Example 1. An isolated 
agent who is not the poorest can displace the poorest person from a coalition that has 
members who are below him in the wealth distribution, by offering a transfer payment. If 
no such coalition exists, then either i = 1, or the person immediately below him in the 
wealth distribution is also isolated, and the two of them can cooperate.      
 
4. Group Size or Composition Effects 
We now return to the case where there are no side payments. We introduce the 
complications that the size of the cooperative group or its composition affects the 
                                                 
4 This might be formalized, using the techniques of Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999) or Xue (2000). 
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productivity of the coalition. We begin with group size effects. In this case, suppose that 
RH = RH(Nu), where Nu is the size of group u in an overall coalition structure. We will 
assume that the function is strictly increasing, so that a larger group is more productive. 
Also, for consistency, we define RH(1) to be RL. Intuitively, there must be some 
underlying economies of scale that yield the outcome of increasing productivity, but we 
do not model them explicitly.  
Obviously, the left hand side of (18) is now increasing in RH, so the incentive 
compatibility conditions are easier to satisfy for members of a larger group, other things 
equal. Thus individuals who would otherwise be left out may now be included in a 
cooperative group. In Example 1, suppose that  3 )) 1 ( (
1
= α − Λ α for a three-person group, 
rather than 2 for any pair. Then the grand coalition can form, since 1’s incentive 
compatibility condition is now satisfied in this case. 
We will illustrate this case further with a slightly different example, and examine the 
impact of redistribution of private capital. In the model considered in Section 3, 
redistribution would help those agents who were isolated, and could not be part of any 
potentially stable coalition, as in the case analyzed in Proposition 3. Narrowing the gap 
between such an individual and one of his neighbors would help him beyond any utility 
gains through redistribution, by increasing his productivity. Conversely, there could be 
redistributions that might destabilize cooperation by increasing inequality between a 
potentially stable pair. In the following example, we will see that there are similar 
complications when group size affects the productivity of cooperation. 
 
Example 2 
Let β=0.9, α=0.5, RL=1, and RH = N 
0.5. 
Then Λ = 10(1 − 0.9 N 
− 0.5). 
Let N = 4, with distribution of shares given by [0.05, 0.2, 0.3, 0.45]. Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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We can calculate that  α α − Λ
1
)) 1 ( ( is 7.625 for a group of 4, 5.769 for a group of 3, and 
3.305 for a group of 2. 
It can then be checked that only the three richest people satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraint for the grand coalition.   
For the coalition {2, 3, 4}, the incentive compatibility constraint is tighter than for the 
richest pair, but it is satisfied for all three individuals, since for the poorest in this group, 
the relevant value is (ST −s2)/s2 = 0.75/0.2 = 3.75. Hence, a stable coalition structure in 
this situation is given by [{1}, {2, 3, 4}]. The alternative structure of [{1, 2}, {3, 4}] will 
not be stable, because 2, 3, and 4 all benefit by 2 joining the richest pair, through the 
increased productivity of the bigger group. The structure [{2}, {1, 3, 4}] is not stable 
because 1’s incentive compatibility constraint is still violated in joining 3 and 4. 
Similarly, the structure [{1, 2, 3}, {4}] is also not stable for the same reason. All other 
cases can also be ruled out, so  [{1}, {2, 3, 4}] is the only stable structure. 
Now suppose that there is a redistribution of private capital from 2 to 3, so that the new 
shares are [0.05, 0.1, 0.4, 0.45]. Now the original structure is no longer stable, because 
2’s incentive compatibility constraint is violated in the grand coalition. The only stable 
coalition structure is now [{1, 2}, {3, 4}]. 
The per-period utility from cooperation is given by  ) 1 ( ) ( 1 α − α α −
α
H i R K . Normalizing K  = 
1, and using the values given for the other variables, this becomes 0.25si N 
0.5. We can 
use this expression to compute the utility profiles for each of the two wealth distributions. 
In the first case, this profile is [0.0125, 0.0866, 0.1299, 0. 1949]. In the second case, the 
utility profile is [0.0177, 0.0354, 0.1414, 0.1591]. We see that the richest person is 
actually hurt by this redistribution, because it destabilizes the larger group, and reduces 
the benefits of scale that were previously enjoyed. Agent 3 is also hurt in this manner, but 
is more than compensated for this loss with a large direct wealth gain. However, the 
nature of the example suggests that there can be cases where even the agent who is the 
beneficiary of a redistribution may be made worse off as a result of destabilizing the 
cooperative group, as we show in Example 3. Also, note that in the current example, total 




We keep the other parameter values of Example 2, but now let the initial distribution of 
shares be [0.04, 0.15, 0.35, 0.46]. We can see that the coalition {1, 2} is not potentially 
stable, whereas the coalition {2, 3, 4} is potentially stable, since (ST −s2)/s2 = 0.81/0.15 = 
5.40. Once again, the only stable coalition structure is [{1}, {2, 3, 4}]. Consider a small 
redistribution from agent 2 to 3, so that the new distribution is [0.04, 0.13, 0.37, 0.46]. 
Now, for the coalition {2, 3, 4}, (ST −s2)/s2 = 0.83/0.13 = 6.38, which is greater than 
α α − Λ
1
)) 1 ( ( , and so the coalition is no longer potentially stable. At the same time, the 
redistribution makes the coalition {1, 2} potentially stable, so that the stable coalition 
structure is now [{1, 2}, {3, 4}]. 
The utility profiles can again be computed from the expression 0.25si N 
0.5, and these are 
[0.0100, 0.0650, 0.1516, 0. 1992] before the redistribution, and [0.0141, 0.0460, 0.1308, 
0.1626] afterwards. Here, all except the poorest agent are hurt by the redistribution, and 
total utility also falls. In particular, however, note that the small redistribution toward 
agent 3 hurts him by removing the possibility of simultaneous cooperation with agents 2 
and 4, in a three-person group.  
 
Example 4 
In the previous two examples, there was a redistribution of private capital from a poorer 
to a richer person, increasing inequality and destabilizing some cooperation. We now 
consider redistribution that reduces inequality and increases the size of the cooperative 
group. Keeping the other parameters the same, let the distribution of shares be given by 
[0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4]. In this case, the grand coalition is still not potentially stable. There are 
two possible stable coalition structures, based on satisfying the incentive compatibility 
constraints. One is [{1}, {2, 3, 4}], while the other is [{1, 2}, {3, 4}]. The utility profiles 
in the two cases are [0.0250, 0.0866, 0.1299, 0.1732] and [0.0354, 0.0707, 0.1061, 
0.1414] respectively. Hence, once again, 2, 3 and 4 can all benefit from 2’s defection to 
join the richest two agents. Thus, only the structure [{1}, {2, 3, 4}] is actually stable. Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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Now consider a redistribution from the richest agent to the poorest, so that the 
distribution of shares becomes [0.13, 0.2, 0.3, 0.37]. Now the grand coalition is stable, 
since 1’s incentive compatibility constraint is now satisfied for this group. Furthermore, 
the utility profile becomes [0.0650, 0.1000, 0.1500, 0.1850], and all agents are better off 
as a result of the redistribution, even the richest agent, who gives up some private capital. 
 
We now turn to the case where group size does not matter, but the average private capital 
of the group affects productivity, so that  ) ( u H H K R R = , where  u K is the average private 
capital of group u. Thus, there are no economies of scale (beyond the benefits of 
cooperation rather than going it alone), but working with someone who has greater 
private capital confers a benefit: we can think of this as a simple case of externality. For 
example, if the private capital is human capital, one may learn more from working with 
someone who is better endowed in this respect. In this case, being in a larger group 
provides no benefits per se. 
In fact, we can say quite a bit more beyond the lack of benefits of larger groups. We have 
the following result. In order to do so, we introduce the notation  ) (T Λ for the value of Λ 
when the coalition is T. 
 
Proposition 10 
If  i i s i i s α
+ α − + Λ ≤
1
1 )) 1 })( 1 , ({ ( for all i = 1, …n-1, no three agents have the same private 
capital, and the productivity of a cooperative group depends only on the average private 
capital of the group then there is a unique stable coalition structure that consists of pairs, 
starting from the richest pair and going down. If N is odd, then the poorest person is 
isolated. 
Proof 
Suppose that the richest two agents in the distribution are in the same group, which 
contains more than two agents. Then, since any adjacent pair can form a potentially stable 
coalition, this pair can be better off by defecting and forming a potentially stable pair, Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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since this will maximize the productivity of the group to which they belong. Note that, 
since now Λ depends on  u K , we have to take account of this effect on the incentive 
compatibility constraints. However, the inequality in the statement of the proposition 
guarantees that they hold for the pair. 
If the richest two agents are in different groups, again they can both defect and combine 
in a potentially stable pair. Since everyone else’s private capital is lower, adding any third 
person to the pair can only reduce productivity and utility. Now consider the remaining 
distribution. One can make exactly the same argument for this distribution: the richest 
two persons remaining are best off by combining in a pair. Repeating this logic, either we 
have N/2 cooperative pairs if N is even, or (N –1)/2 pairs when N is odd, with the poorest 
p e r s o n   i s o l a t e d .            
 
Finally, we consider the case where the productivity of cooperation has scale effects as 




j H H K r R . Now it pays to 
be in a cooperative group that is larger as well as wealthier: it increases one’s utility, as 
well as relaxing the incentive compatibility constraints. It is easy to see that both kinds of 
effects explored earlier in this section will be operative. There will be a tendency toward 
larger coalitions, and, holding size constant, ones made up of wealthier agents rather than 
poorer ones. One can easily construct examples such as Example 4 for this case as well. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has formulated a simple model of cooperation that captures some of the 
incentive considerations that affect the joint provision of infrastructure that will be 
subsequently used by group members. We postulate that repeated interaction can 
sometimes overcome moral hazard problems, but we find that this possibility is limited 
by within-group inequality. Therefore, the nature and inequality of the initial wealth 
distribution can affect the degree to which cooperation can be sustained. In fact, we have 
developed some illustrative cases in which redistribution from the rich to the poor Inequality and Collective Action: Bardhan & Singh, May 2004 
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improves the welfare of the rich, by making it possible to sustain greater cooperation than 
was previously possible.  
Clearly, our results are for a special model, but one that has appealing features. Given the 
complexity of analyzing coalition formation in full, abstract generality, some additional 
structure is required to derive definite results on the nature of equilibrium. Our modeling 
to focus on inequality contrasts our analysis with other special models of coalition 
formation, in which symmetry is important in obtaining characterization results. In fact, 
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